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SYMPOSIUM, ERIE AT EIGHTY: CHOICE OF LAW ACROSS THE DISCIPLINES 
 
 
ERIE DOCTRINE, STATE LAW, AND CIVIL RIGHTS 
LITIGATION 
Alexander A. Reinert* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Imagine what the Erie doctrine would look like if the seminal case1 
involved the relevance of the Rules of Decision Act in a suit brought 
against Erie County for federal civil rights violations with pendent state 
law claims instead of a common law tort action brought against the Erie 
Railroad Company. Perhaps the plaintiff claimed Erie County 
intentionally hid evidence related to the plaintiff’s federal and related state 
law claims. Should federal or state common law spoliation doctrine 
govern the standard applied and available remedies? Or what if, after trial, 
the plaintiff prevailed on both state and federal claims? If federal judge-
made law permitted a multiplier of the lodestar for attorneys’ fees, but not 
state law (or vice versa), the Court might have had to choose whose law 
should apply when it was impossible to disentangle time spent on one set 
of claims or another. If these were the disputes that characterized the first 
Erie case, what would our choice of law framework look like when state 
law questions arise in federal court? 
Both cases and commentary suggest that the doctrine would look the 
same. We know that Erie requires federal courts sitting in diversity 
jurisdiction to apply state substantive law to resolve state law claims.2 But 
almost all scholars and jurists also maintain that Erie applies when federal 
 
* Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law. I am grateful for the thoughtful comments 
of the participants in the University of Akron School of Law’s “Erie at Eighty: Choice of Law Across 
the Disciplines,” including Craig Green, Michael Green, Laura Little, Michael Morley, and Ernest 
Young. 
 1.  Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
 2.  Id. at 79–80. 
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courts sit in federal question—or arising under—jurisdiction.3 Erie itself 
said that “[e]xcept in matters governed by the Federal Constitution or by 
Acts of Congress, the law to be applied in any case is the law of the 
State.”4 Yet, for the most part, neither scholars nor federal judges have 
taken the time to explain the precise role of Erie or the Rules of Decision 
Act (RDA) in federal question cases. In other scholarship, I have argued 
that Erie questions should be put in their jurisdictional context.5 I 
provided a framework for examining such questions that I referred to as 
“Erie Step Zero.” In this essay, I expand on that framework by illustrating 
how to consider the problem in cases involving civil rights litigation. 
At the outset, it is worth noting that the issue is more than marginally 
significant. One would not know it if one only read the Supreme Court 
decisions—every Erie case decided by the U.S. Supreme Court has arisen 
through diversity jurisdiction.6 But lower courts have had to address the 
problem in multiple contexts. First, and certainly most common, are those 
cases in which state law claims are raised because they share a “common 
nucleus of operative fact”7 with a claim over which there is an 
independent basis for arising under jurisdiction.8 For the most part, courts 
have assumed that Erie applies without any modification to these pendent 
state law claims.9 At the same time, when state law issues have arisen in 
federal civil rights litigation—say application of privilege law—courts 
have resisted applying state law if it interferes with federal interests.10 
In my prior work, I proposed that, contrary to the conventional 
wisdom, the Erie analysis should be placed in the jurisdictional context in 
which the choice of law arises. For instance, in diversity cases, we 
consider whether the choice between state and federal law is outcome 
 
 3.  I review the literature in greater detail in other work. See Alexander A. Reinert, Erie Step 
Zero, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 2341, 2346–52 (2017). One notable exception will be discussed below. 
See infra Part I.A. See generally Peter Westen & Jeffrey S. Lehman, Is There Life for Erie After the 
Death of Diversity?, 78 MICH. L. REV. 311 (1980) (arguing that the Erie doctrine should apply 
differently in federal question and supplemental jurisdiction claims). 
 4.  Erie, 304 U.S. at 78 (emphasis added). 
 5.  See Reinert, supra note 3, at 2372-76. Michael Green has argued along similar lines. See 
Michael Steven Green, The Twin Aims of Erie, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1865 (2013). 
 6.  To be clear, by “Erie case” I mean every case in which the Court relied upon the Erie 
doctrine to resolve a choice-of-law question. In some federal question cases, the Court has explicitly 
declined to apply the Erie analysis. See Reinert, supra note 3, aat 2356-58 & nn. 
 7.  See United Mine Workers of America v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966). 
 8.  See 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (2012); Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715. These state law claims share a common 
nucleus with a parallel federal law claim asserted in the plaintiff’s complaint or may enter a federal 
question case as compulsory or permissive counterclaims raised by the defendant. 
 9.  Reinert, supra note 3, at 2352–62. 
 10.  Infra Part III.A. 
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determinative in light of “the twin aims of the Erie rule.”11 These twin 
aims—avoiding forum shopping and inequitable administration of laws 
based on the citizenship of the parties12—have particular resonance in 
diversity of citizenship jurisdiction. But they do not necessarily translate 
to cases in which jurisdiction is founded on a federal question. And as I 
will discuss in detail later, they may be particularly inapt for claims 
seeking remedies for federal civil rights violations.13 On the other hand, 
Hanna v. Plumer’s14 insistence that we think of outcome 
determinativeness from an ex ante rather than ex post perspective15 is 
sensible regardless of the jurisdictional context. 
Taking these two insights together, therefore, I have proposed that 
courts ask about forum shopping and inequity from an ex ante perspective 
while recognizing that arising under jurisdiction serves different purposes 
than diversity jurisdiction. Whereas diversity jurisdiction makes federal 
courts available to resolve state law claims in a forum free from bias based 
on state citizenship, arising under jurisdiction makes federal courts 
available to resolve federal law issues. This is because federal judges 
might be more experienced, solicitous, and knowledgeable about federal 
law, and because it serves the federal system’s interest in uniformity.16 
When state law questions arise in federal question cases, they are almost 
always intimately connected to the federal issues; perhaps they arise 
through a state law claim that is part of the federal question claim’s 
“common nucleus of operative fact,”17 perhaps they arise through a state 
law claim that contains an embedded and significant federal issue,18 or 
perhaps it is necessary to resolve state law issues to resolve a federally 
created legal claim.19 In all of these cases, concerns about forum shopping 
should be focused on those instances in which the choice of a federal 
 
 11.  See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 468–69 (1965). 
 12.  Id. 
 13.  See infra notes 40-42. 
 14.  380 U.S. 460 (1965). 
 15.  See id. at 468–69. 
 16.  See Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng’g. & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 312 (2005) 
(“The doctrine captures the commonsense notion that a federal court ought to be able to hear claims 
recognized under state law that nonetheless turn on substantial questions of federal law, and thus 
justify resort to the experience, solicitude, and hope of uniformity that a federal forum offers on 
federal issues.”). 
 17.  See, e.g., United Mine Workers of America v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966). 
 18.  See, e.g., Grable, 545 U.S. at 313. 
 19.  See State of Indiana ex rel. Anderson v. Brand, 303 U.S. 95, 100 (1938) (making an 
independent determination of state law in a case founded on the Contract Clause, and not deferring 
wholesale to the decision of the state’s highest court, “in order that the constitutional mandate may 
not become a dead letter”). 
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forum is motivated by something other than the recognized and beneficial 
reasons for which we make federal courts available to resolve federal law. 
Similarly, concerns about inequity should not be focused on citizenship 
but on the differences in treatment between state law claimants who do or 
do not have access to federal courts. Finally, to the extent Hanna 
suggested that the balancing of interests introduced by Byrd v. Blue Ridge 
Cooperative20 was unnecessary or unimportant, examining Erie in the 
context of federal question jurisdiction brings that balancing back to the 
fore. 
I take this analysis further in this essay because the interests at stake 
in federal civil rights litigation sometimes call for skepticism towards state 
law and an embrace of federal court jurisdiction. Indeed, there has long 
been a link between substantive enforcement of federal civil rights and the 
provision of federal jurisdiction to resolve such claims. Therefore, the 
particular jurisdictional context of civil rights litigation may sometimes 
call for even greater solicitude for federal law.21 
The value of this framework is not just that it helps to resolve 
conflicts where application of state law interferes with federal claims (to 
which courts have been sensitive). It also helps to frame how to address 
circumstances where state law might be more open to federal civil rights 
claims. Courts have neglected to view these circumstances through a 
coherent lens. 
The first part of this essay briefly reviews my prior proposal and then 
explains its particular salience in civil rights litigation. I revisit my 
framework that contextualizes the Erie analysis with respect to the 
different goals of diversity and federal question jurisdiction. Critical to 
this framework is recognizing that the first question in resolving a choice-
of-law dispute between federal and state law is what I have called “Erie 
Step Zero”—one must situate the dispute in its jurisdictional context 
before moving to the more familiar Erie choice of law analysis. In part II, 
I argue that the jurisdictional context of federal civil rights litigation 
presents unique concerns when considering how to apply state law. Part 
III then turns to specific examples of how conflicts between state and 
federal law might be raised and resolved in federal civil rights litigation. 
II. THE RELEVANCE OF JURISDICTIONAL CONTEXT TO ERIE QUESTIONS 
In my prior work, I have engaged in a detailed survey of the scholarly 
and judicial approach to Erie’s application outside of the diversity of 
 
 20.  Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Co-op., Inc., 356 U.S. 525 (1958). 
 21.  See infra notes 40-42 and accompanying text. 
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citizenship context. In this essay, I will not belabor the point. In short, 
courts and commentators almost uniformly assert that Erie questions are 
the same whether they arise in diversity or arising under jurisdiction.22 
The basis for this view is largely unexamined and, to the extent its 
proponents cite to case law or other authority, unsupported.23 
Instead, once one closely examines Erie and its progeny, a basis for 
a contrary account emerges: traditional Erie analysis, with its focus on 
forum shopping concerns and unfairness based on state citizenship status, 
is rooted in the diversity of citizenship context. This was not obvious from 
the start—for although the Court has only considered Erie choice of law 
questions in the context of diversity cases, when it began elaborating on 
the Erie doctrine in cases like Guaranty Trust v. York24 and Byrd v. Blue 
Ridge Cooperative,25 the Court did not explicitly tie its analysis of the 
distinction between substance and procedure to the jurisdictional context 
of diversity cases. But when the Supreme Court recalibrated the Erie 
analysis in Hanna v. Plumer,26 it did so with diversity jurisdiction in mind. 
Hanna’s key insight, for the purpose of this essay, was that 
determining the line between substance and procedure required in part a 
determination of whether a rule was outcome-determinative in light of 
Erie’s twin aims: reducing both forum shopping and inequitable outcomes 
based on the citizenship of the parties.27 The Court’s reasoning was 
founded on the relationship between diversity jurisdiction and the Erie 
doctrine. First, the Court emphasized that the pre-Erie doctrine of Swift v. 
Tyson28—in which federal courts were free to disregard state common-
law decisions in diversity cases—had undermined the very purpose of 
diversity jurisdiction, which was to level the playing field between 
citizens and noncitizens of a state.29 Because Swift made choice of law 
turn on whether the case was brought in federal or state court, it gave the 
out-of-state citizen-plaintiff the power to determine choice of law with the 
initial filing decision.30 Thus, Erie’s concern, highlighted by Hanna, 
 
 22.  Reinert, supra note 3, at 2346–62. 
 23.  Id. at 2362–67. 
 24.  Guaranty Tr. Co. of N.Y. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945). 
 25.  356 U.S. 525 (1958). 
 26.  380 U.S. 460 (1965). 
 27.  Id. 
 28.  Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. 1 (1842). 
 29.  Hanna, 380 U.S. at 467. 
 30.  If the out-of-state plaintiff wished to take advantage of the state rule, she would file in state 
court, preventing the in-state defendant from removing. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b)(2) (2012) (prohibiting 
removal on diversity grounds if the defendant is a citizen of the state in which suit was brought). If 
the out-of-state plaintiff sought the benefit of the federal rule, she would file in federal court, where 
the defendant could not shift the case to state court. 
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about the inequitable administration of the laws was directly tied to the 
mechanics of diversity jurisdiction. Erie’s concern about forum shopping, 
also highlighted by Hanna, was less directly tied to diversity jurisdiction. 
Nonetheless, Erie’s concern seemed to be that parties had manipulated 
their own citizenship to create diversity jurisdiction so as to take 
advantage of a particular rule that would be applied under the Swift 
doctrine.31 Nowhere did the Court in Hanna or Erie discuss concerns 
about forum shopping in the context of federal question cases. 
The concerns that animated Hanna do not transfer seamlessly to the 
federal question context. The forum shopping that Hannah was concerned 
about in diversity cases, for example, may not always be of concern in 
federal question cases. After all, the purpose of Section 1331 jurisdiction 
is to encourage forum shopping when the parties wish to resort to the 
promise of experience, solicitude, and uniformity with respect to federal 
law that are thought to be provided by federal courts.32 
The Hannah Court was understandably concerned about the potential 
for the Erie doctrine to be used as a tool to foment inequality based on 
state citizenship. After all, the purpose of diversity jurisdiction is to reduce 
the potential for differential treatment based on state citizenship. It would 
be a perverse outcome if Erie analysis undermined that goal. In the context 
of federal question jurisdiction, however, that kind of bias is simply not at 
issue, nor could Erie analysis exacerbate inequality along the axis of state 
citizenship.33 
Placed in its jurisdictional context, therefore, Erie questions that 
arise in federal question cases should be analyzed with different concerns 
in mind. Rather than inequity based on citizenship, we should be focused 
on potential inequity based on the happenstance that a litigant is able to 
bring a state law claim into a federal forum simply because it overlaps 
with the factual and legal contours of a federal question claim or simply 
because it implicates the need to resolve a substantial federal issue.34 We 
also would want to avoid adjudicating state law claims differently simply 
because a litigant has chosen to frame them as supplemental claims to a 
federal question anchor if the litigant also could have brought them 
independently as diversity claims.35 
 
 31.  Erie R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 73 (1938) (discussing Black & White Taxicab & 
Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab & Transfer Co., 276 U.S. 518 (1928)); see also Hanna, 380 
U.S. at 467 n.8 (citing Black & White Taxicab, 276 U.S. at 518). 
 32.  Reinert, supra note 3, at 2372. 
 33.  Id. at 2372–73. 
 34.  Id. at 2373. 
 35.  Id. at 2373–74. 
ERIE 04 REINERET MACRO 2.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 5/29/2019  2:02 PM 
2019] ERIE AND FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS LITIGATION 225 
As to forum shopping, we should be on the lookout for cases in which 
parties choose federal court for reasons other than those recognized as 
valid for the purposes of arising under and supplemental jurisdiction. The 
motivation for bringing pendent state law claims in federal court may have 
nothing to do with forum shopping but instead may relate to efficiency 
goals or rules of preclusion, which create an incentive to bring the claims 
together in the same jurisdiction.36 Indeed, if the federal question claim is 
the moving force in the litigation, the litigant who invokes supplemental 
jurisdiction may fundamentally be motivated by the desire to “resort to 
the experience, solicitude, and hope of uniformity that a federal forum 
offers on federal issues.”37 This choice is one to be supported, not one that 
should arouse suspicion. And to the extent that forum shopping might be 
present, it would likely be filtered out by a district court’s application of 
28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(2), which authorizes a district court to decline the 
exercise of supplemental jurisdiction when the pendent claim 
substantially predominates over the federal question claim. 
After one has conducted this outcome-determinative test, modified 
for federal question jurisdiction, there still is the potential that Byrd 
balancing should play a role.38 To be sure, if a court decides that the choice 
between federal and state law is not outcome determinative, then it will 
be free to apply the federal rule. If a court decides that the choice is 
outcome determinative, however, it should move to Byrd balancing to 
determine whether federal interests are sufficiently important to outweigh 
the state interest in applying its rule. For if one is concerned that Hanna’s 
analysis gives short shrift to federal interests in diversity cases,39 one 
should presumably be at least as concerned when we move to the federal 
question context. 
III. ERIE STEP ZERO AND CIVIL RIGHTS LITIGATION IN FEDERAL COURT 
Applying this framework in the context of federal civil rights 
litigation has additional implications. First, if jurisdictional context 
matters for resolving Erie questions, then civil rights litigation is a special 
brand of arising under jurisdiction. When the Reconstruction-era Civil 
Rights laws were passed—creating substantive rights to enforce federal 
 
 36.  Id. at 2374. 
 37.  Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 312 (2005). 
 38.  Reinert, supra note 3, at 2374–75. 
 39.  Martin H. Redish & Carter G. Phillips, Erie and the Rules of Decision Act: In Search of the 
Appropriate Dilemma, 91 HARV. L. REV. 356, 360 (1977) (criticizing Hanna precisely because it 
shifted focus from the balance between federal and state interests prioritized in Byrd to avoidance of 
forum shopping and litigant inequity).  
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constitutional norms against state actors—they included a specific 
jurisdictional provision (now 28 U.S.C. § 1343), that gave federal courts 
jurisdiction over such actions. At the time, the general federal question 
jurisdiction statute (the precursor to 28 U.S.C. § 1331), included an 
amount-in-controversy requirement, which stayed in place until 1980.40 
But the provision granting jurisdiction over civil rights actions never 
contained an amount-in-controversy requirement. Congress believed that 
the rights protected by the 1871 Civil Rights Act were important enough 
that federal jurisdiction over them should not depend on the valuation of 
particular constitutional rights.41 As the Supreme Court viewed it, the 
substantive rights created by the 1871 Act would have been meaningless 
without the jurisdictional grant.42 Thus, it is not just that federal arising 
under jurisdiction offers a venue in which federal law would be received 
without hostility—federal court jurisdiction was viewed as essential to 
full enforcement of civil rights. 
There is a second aspect of federal civil rights litigation related to the 
jurisdictional grant that also gives a different timbre to Erie questions that 
may arise in civil rights litigation in federal courts. Civil rights litigation 
in federal court, particularly litigation embraced by Section 1343’s 
jurisdictional grant, is often brought against state actors of some kind. The 
Reconstruction Congress was understandably skeptical of the willingness 
or ability of state courts to entertain such suits in an unbiased way. This is 
reflected in the jurisdictional statute discussed above and also in the 
substantive treatment of, for example, Section 1983 claims. As just one 
example, in Monroe v. Pape the Court made clear that federal civil rights 
claims are actionable without regard to whether remedies exist under state 
law—a person acts under color of state law whether or not her conduct is 
authorized or lawful under state law.43 Holding to the contrary, the Court 
concluded, would leave the enforcement of substantive federal rights 
 
 40.  See Pub. L. 96-486 (eliminating $10,000 amount in controversy requirement for general 
federal question jurisdiction). The amount in controversy requirement had been eliminated in part in 
1976, when it was removed for claims against the United States and federal officials sued in their 
official capacity. See Pub. L. 94-574. 
 41.  The interrelationship of general federal question jurisdiction and Section 1343 was 
discussed at length in Hague v. Committee for Indus. Organization, 307 U.S. 496, 529 (1939). 
 42.  See Hague, 307 U.S. at 529 (“We can hardly suppose that Congress, having in the broad 
terms of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 vested in all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States 
a right of action in equity for the deprivation of constitutional immunities, cognizable only in the 
federal courts, intended by the Act of 1875 to destroy those rights of action by withholding from the 
courts of the United States jurisdiction to entertain them.”). 
 43.  365 U.S. 167, 183 (1961). 
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subject to the vagaries of state law, a result that was in tension with the 
overriding purpose of the 1871 Civil Rights Act and its brethren.44 
How does this translate to the application of Erie in civil rights 
litigation in federal court?  Diversity jurisdiction is founded on the need 
to avoid bias of state courts based on citizenship. Federal civil rights 
jurisdiction is founded on the need to avoid state court bias in favor of 
state institutions and actors. When Erie questions arise in these distinct 
contexts, Erie analysis should be tailored to the goals to be achieved by 
the distinct jurisdictional grants. In diversity cases, Erie analysis should 
be concerned with bias based on citizenship—in particular bias against in-
state residents in favor of out-of-state residents—while in federal civil 
rights litigation one should apply Erie conscious of avoiding bias in favor 
of state institutions. 
Under this rubric, application of state law should be disfavored in 
federal civil rights litigation if it interferes with enforcement of 
substantive federal civil rights claims. In many respects, the law already 
takes account of this in situations in which federal claims are directly 
implicated—when federal courts borrow from state law to fill in gaps that 
laws like Section 1983 leave open.45 But courts are less attuned to this 
when asked to apply state law to pendent state claims, even when the 
application of state law could have an impact on enforcement of the 
federal claim. 
Moreover, in some areas of law, courts have neglected at all to 
consider what should happen when state institutions make themselves 
more amenable to suit than federal law provides. Courts have not seen this 
as a choice of law problem, but there are reasons to reconsider that 
assumption. I explore the ramifications here for the doctrine of qualified 
immunity. 
I concede that as a bottom-line matter, this analysis may result in 
courts declaring that some rules are substantive for diversity purposes but 
not for federal question purposes, which will be troubling to some. Some 
scholars already recoil against the related idea of having dual readings of 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure depending on whether the basis for 
jurisdiction is diversity or federal question.46 But the Supreme Court has 
acknowledged at times that the line between substance and procedure 
 
 44.  Id. at 180. 
 45.  Federal courts borrow state law under 42 U.S.C. (1988) to fill in gaps in federal law when 
adjudicating federal claims, but not if state law is hostile to federal interests. 
 46.  See Jennifer S. Hendricks, In Defense of the Substance-Procedure Dichotomy, 89 WASH. 
U. L. REV. 103, 125 (2011). 
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might differ depending on whether jurisdiction is based on diversity or the 
presence of a federal question.47 
Lower courts have implied the same at times,48 but there is little 
consistency in how courts have addressed the question. Many courts, 
applying the intuition that Erie applies regardless of the basis for 
jurisdiction, have concluded that state law controls both the federal and 
supplemental state law claims even if they would have disregarded state 
law were the federal claim brought on its own.49 And some, while 
acknowledging the force of the argument that there is a difference between 
the jurisdictional contexts, ask if providing a different approach for such 
questions is justifiable as a practical matter.50 But the lower courts have 
 
 47.  Levinson v. Deupree, 345 U.S. 648, 652 (1953). In Levinson, the Court held that federal 
practice regarding amendments to pleadings applied to an admiralty case but recognized that the issue 
might be analyzed differently were jurisdiction founded on diversity. (“Whether, if this were a 
diversity case, we would consider that we are here dealing with ‘forms and modes’ or with matters 
more seriously affecting the enforcement of the right, it is clear that we are not dealing with an integral 
part of the right created by Kentucky.”). Id. 
 48.  For example, when lower courts heard Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA) cases 
under diversity jurisdiction, as they had assumed that the TCPA did not create a federal cause of 
action, they applied Erie to choice of law disputes. See, e.g., Gottlieb v. Carnival Corp., 436 F.3d 335, 
342 (2d Cir. 2006); Holster v. Gatco, Inc., 485 F.Supp.2d 179, 183–84 (E.D.N.Y. 2007), aff’d, 618 
F.3d 214 (2d Cir. 2010), overruled on other grounds; Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. 
Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393 (2010). After the Supreme Court clarified that the TCPA does create 
federal question jurisdiction, see Mims v. Arrow Fin. Servs., LLC, 565 U.S. 368 (2012), however, 
lower courts felt free to disregard Erie, see, e.g., Bailey v. Domino’s Pizza, LLC, 867 F.Supp.2d 835, 
839–40 (E.D. La. 2012). Even outside of the TCPA context, courts have recognized the possibility 
that a state law could be substantive for diversity but not federal question contexts. See, e.g., Doe v. 
City of Chicago, 883 F.Supp. 1126, 1134 (N.D. Ill. 1994) (discussing the role of a state law affidavit 
of merit requirement). 
 49.  Bradley v. City of Ferndale, 148 F. App’x 499, 511 (6th Cir. 2005) (looking to state law to 
determine if denial of immunity is subject to interlocutory appeal where a state law claim is 
supplemental to a § 1983 claim); Aliotta v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 315 F.3d 756, 759 (7th Cir. 
2003) (applying state law to a jury instructions issue involving a state law claim in which there was 
federal question jurisdiction); In re Larry’s Apartment, L.L.C., 249 F.3d 832, 838 (9th Cir. 2001) 
(“[A] federal court sitting in diversity applies state law in deciding whether to allow attorney’s fees 
when those fees are connected to the substance of the case.”); Mangold v. Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 
67 F.3d 1470, 1478 (9th Cir. 1995) (applying state law to determine the fee award where a plaintiff 
in a civil rights case prevailed on federal and state causes of action); Alvarado v. Fed. Express Corp., 
Nos. C 04-0098 SI, C 04-0099 SI, 2008 WL 2340211, at *4 (N.D. Cal. June 5, 2008) (“If the jury had 
based its verdicts solely on Title VII, federal law would govern the award of fees. Because the jury 
verdicts were based on both federal and state law claims, however, the Erie doctrine dictates that state 
law governs the issuance of attorney fees.”); Chin v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 461 F.Supp.2d 279, 283 
(D.N.J. 2006) (applying state law regarding attorney’s fees in a case in which state law claims were 
supplemental to claims under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act). 
 50.  See, e.g., Allan Erbsen, Erie’s Four Functions: Reframing Choice of Law in Federal 
Courts, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 579 at 658 n.286 (2013) (acknowledging possible difference in 
interpretive approaches but inviting analysis of whether “such confusing differences are necessary in 
practice”). 
ERIE 04 REINERET MACRO 2.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 5/29/2019  2:02 PM 
2019] ERIE AND FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS LITIGATION 229 
been forced to address this question without sufficient guidance from the 
Supreme Court or commentators. 
IV.  EXAMPLES OF CONFLICTS BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL 
LAW IN CIVIL RIGHTS LITIGATION 
A. Erie Step Zero and Privilege Law 
One of the most common areas in which a conflict between state and 
federal law has arisen in federal question cases with supplemental state 
law claims is privilege law.51 Indeed, in the debate regarding the adoption 
of Federal Rule of Evidence 501, the Senate Judiciary Committee was 
concerned about how Rule 501 would be applied in federal question cases 
with pendent state law claims.52 But Rule 501 did not resolve the problem, 
stating unhelpfully that where state law “supplies the rules of decision,” 
privilege claims should be governed by state law.53 The intent was to 
incorporate Erie analysis into Rule 501 because there were some 
questions about whether state law as to privileges would be considered 
substantive under Hanna.54 This works fine in a diversity case but not in 
a federal question case with pendent state law claims because states 
recognize privileges from disclosure that could limit both the information 
disclosed during pretrial discovery and the evidence presented at trial.55 If 
state law privileges were applied during pretrial discovery to bar access to 
information relevant to a federal question claim, it could substantially 
interfere with enforcement of a federal right. If it were enforced during 
trial, such that relevant statements were not admissible at all, even on 
federal law claims, or certain statements were admissible on certain 
 
 51.  Martin I. Kaminsky, State Evidentiary Privileges in Federal Civil Litigation, 43 FORDHAM 
L. REV. 923 at 948 (1975) (recognizing that the question of privileges becomes more difficult when 
there are supplemental state law claims in a federal question case). 
 52.  Id. at 958–60 (detailing rulemakers’ concern that Federal Rule of Evidence 501 might 
apply differently depending on the jurisdictional basis of the claim). 
 53.  FED. R. EVID. 501; see also In re Yasmin & Yaz (Drospirenone) Mktg., Sales Practices & 
Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 3:09-md-02100-DRH-PMF, 2011 WL 1375011, at *1 (S.D. Ill. Apr. 12, 2011) 
(MDL action). 
 54.  See H.R. REP. NO. 93-650, at 9 (1973) (stating that privilege rules should be considered 
substantive for Erie purposes); see also In re Grand Jury Investigation, 918 F.2d 374, 379 n.6 (3d Cir. 
1990); Laxalt v. McClatchy, 116 F.R.D. 438, 446 (D. Nev. 1987); Theodore Campagnolo, The 
Conflict Between State Press Shield Laws and Federal Criminal Proceedings: The Rule 501 Blues, 
38 GONZ. L. REV. 445, 500 (2002); Harold L. Korn, Professor, N.Y.U. Sch. of Law, Remarks on the 
Continuing Effect of State Rules of Evidence in the Federal Courts (June 21, 1969), in A Discussion 
of the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence Before the Annual Judicial Conference Second Judicial 
Circuit of the United States, 48 F.R.D. 39, 75 (1969)  
 55.  Rule 501 applies to all stages of a civil proceeding, not just at trial. See FED. R. EVID. 
1101(c). 
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claims but not others, it would either directly or indirectly interfere with 
distinct federal interests. 
Using the framework proposed here, however, would clarify how 
courts should resolve these issues. For example, if the state law privilege 
barred access to evidence or discovery that was relevant only to the state 
law claim, it could be enforced in full—in this circumstance, there would 
be no conflict between applying state and federal privilege law. To the 
extent that there is a conflict, however, one could rely on the modified 
Erie analysis to resolve it. Do we expect, ex ante, that a federal forum was 
chosen so as to take advantage of the federal privilege laws in the 
adjudication of the state law claim? Is there a concern about inequity in 
the application of state privilege law because of the happenstance that in 
this case the state law claims share common facts with a federal question 
claim? Is the state privilege law one that protects governmental 
institutions and state actors from accountability for unlawful conduct? 
Even if the answers to these questions suggest that the choice of law is 
outcome determinative, how should the federal interests be balanced 
against those of the state? 
If the claim sounds in civil rights, there may be even stronger 
arguments for applying federal law where evidence or discovery is 
relevant to all claims. The jurisdictional grant in civil rights claims is 
deeply connected to substantive rights enforcement. And it would 
undermine federal interests if the presence of a supplemental state law 
claim made it harder to enforce federal civil rights. If enforcement of the 
state law privilege law will have an impact throughout the entire case, it 
is more likely that a court should choose to enforce federal common law. 
As it turns out, most courts have come to a similar conclusion. Some 
courts have held that federal law applies across the board to both federal 
claims and pendent state law claims.56 Others have held that the federal 
law of privilege governs where the evidence sought is relevant to both 
federal and state law claims, an outcome more consistent with my 
proposed framework.57 
 
 56.  See Tucker v. United States, 143 F.Supp.2d 619, 622–25 (S.D. W. Va. 2001) (applying 
federal privilege law to a Federal Tort Claims Act claim and to a pendent state law claim, based both 
on interpretation of Rule 501 and principles of uniformity); In re Combustion, Inc., 161 F.R.D. 51, 
53–54 (W.D. La.), aff’d, 161 F.R.D. 54 (W.D. La. 1995) (finding that federal law applied across the 
board in part because the relevant federal statutes both provided for exclusive jurisdiction). 
 57.  See Reinert, supra note 3, at 2360 n.108. 
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B. Erie Step Zero and Cost-Shifting 
Several courts have held, in the supplemental jurisdiction context, 
that the Erie doctrine requires that state law govern awards of attorney’s 
fees in cases where a judgment is based on both federal and state claims.58 
The framework I propose here would raise questions about this approach. 
For it is well recognized that, in areas such as Title VII and Section 1983, 
for instance, fee- and cost-shifting provisions are part and parcel of 
effective enforcement of the statutory regime.59 Thus, if applying state 
fee-shifting rules to federal law claims undermines those substantive 
goals, it may be inappropriate to do so. It may be that in cases that have 
common facts, costs and fees attributable to a state law claim are 
indistinguishable from those attributable to a federal law claim. But if that 
is the case, one still needs a valid reason to choose state law over federal 
law to govern cost shifting. 
Some examples may be of assistance. In an age discrimination case, 
a jury awards damages based on both federal and state law. Federal law 
prohibits a multiplier for attorneys’ fees under certain circumstances, but 
state law permits it. May the court apply a multiplier to the lodestar for all 
claims or only the state law claim?60 One court that analyzed the question 
used traditional Erie analysis and applied state law to calculate attorneys’ 
fees because applying state law in state court but not in federal court 
would lead to forum shopping and inequity.61 In other words, the state 
method for calculating attorneys’ fees was substantive and due to be 
enforced through the RDA. The court did not address whether this holding 
applied only to state law claims. 
But the matter is not so simple—if it is impossible to distinguish 
between time spent on a federal claim and a state claim (and often it will 
be), applying state law might have the impact of providing greater 
recovery for attorneys’ fees than is permitted under federal law. The 
framework I propose would ask courts to consider whether doing so 
 
 58.  See id. at 2376 n.211. 
 59.  See, e.g., SEAN FARHANG, THE LITIGATION STATE: PUBLIC REGULATION AND PRIVATE 
LAWSUITS IN THE U.S. 4, 62 (2010); Margaret H. Lemos, Special Incentives to Sue, 95 MINN. L. REV. 
782, 793–94 (2011); cf. Chambers v. Nasco, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 55–56 (1991) (concluding that the 
district court acted within its discretion in a diversity case by invoking its inherent power and 
assessing attorney’s fees and expenses as a sanction for a party’s bad faith litigation conduct, and 
rejecting an Erie challenge to the district court’s action). 
 60.  This hypothetical is based on Mangold v. Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 67 F.3d 1470, 1478 
(9th Cir. 1995) (applying state law to determine the fee award where a plaintiff in a civil rights case 
prevailed on federal and state causes of action). 
 61.  Id. at 1479. 
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would undermine federal interests. In this case, it is hard to construct an 
argument that applying state law would ultimately undermine federal law. 
But if we take the basic holding and treat it as creating a rule that 
entitlement to attorneys’ fees is substantive, how should one address a 
different problem? Under federal law, statutory attorneys’ fees belong to 
the client. Under state law, statutory attorneys’ fees belong to the attorney, 
and the attorney therefore has standing to seek fees even where the client 
disclaims any such intention. In a federal civil rights case with pendent 
state law claims, does the attorney have standing to seek statutory fees as 
a prevailing party?62 If the right to seek attorneys’ fees is substantive, can 
it be argued that the question of who may assert that right is clearly 
procedural? And again, if time spent on state and federal claims is 
indistinguishable, may a lawyer use federal courts to obtain attorneys 
fees’ simply because she can append a state law claim to it that carries 
with it a substantive right for attorney enforcement?63 
C. Erie Step Zero and Spoliation 
Federal and state law differ as to what standard to use for pre-
litigation spoliation of evidence and what remedy may be obtained. In a 
case in which there are federal law claims and pendent state law claims, 
part of a common nucleus of operative fact, what standard may be applied 
to pre-litigation spoliation of evidence?64 Under traditional Erie analysis, 
where the case arises in a diversity context, state substantive law on 
spoliation will be applied.65 
But in the context of federal civil rights litigation, should the same 
result obtain? If the spoliation has an impact on both the federal and state 
claims, does the federal court violate the RDA by imposing federal 
spoliation law? Does it undermine federal interests by applying state 
spoliation law? 
In application, much likely depends on which spoliation law can be 
considered to impose stricter obligations. If state law is more onerous than 
federal law, it advances state substantive policy by applying state law and 
 
 62.  This hypothetical is based on Alvarado v. Fed. Express Corp., Nos. C 04-0098 SI, C 04-
0099 SI, 2008 WL 2340211, at *4 (N.D. Cal. June 5, 2008) (“If the jury had based its verdicts solely 
on Title VII, federal law would govern the award of fees. Because the jury verdicts were based on 
both federal and state law claims, however, the Erie doctrine dictates that state law governs the 
issuance of attorney fees.”) 
 63.  As one court saw it, much depended on whether the plaintiff prevailed on state law claims 
or “solely on federal claims.” Alvarado, 2008 WL 2340211, at *4. 
 64.  ArcelorMittal Indiana Harbor LLC v. Amex Nooter, LLC, No. 2:15-CV-195-PRC, 2018 
WL 509890, at *4 (N.D. Ind. Jan. 23, 2018) 
 65.  See Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 53–54 (1991). 
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does not undermine any articulable federal interests. Nor is it in tension 
with any of the reasons that jurisdiction is exercised in federal court. 
Different state law might create disuniformity in federal court, but we can 
tolerate this result without undermining other important federal interests. 
If federal law imposes stricter obligations, does it undermine state 
substantive law to apply federal law in the context of connected state and 
federal law claims? We might answer this question yes only if the state 
law claims are the driving force behind the litigation, itself an independent 
reason to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction. In the absence of 
that condition being present, failing to apply federal law would undermine 
important federal interests connected to vindicating federal civil rights. In 
a jurisdictional context, the Erie analysis is more complex than the 
straightforward diversity-based inquiry. 
D. Erie Step Zero and Anti-SLAPP Laws 
At least thirty-two states have passed so-called Anti-SLAPP 
legislation, purporting to target “Strategic Lawsuits Against Public 
Participation,” also known as SLAPP suits.66 Anti-SLAPP measures as a 
general matter seek to protect individuals who exercise their right to 
petition the government to address pressing social problems, but in some 
states they have been enacted to provide even broader protections.67 In the 
Erie context, anti-SLAPP statutes can be troublesome because they can 
affect only specific claims within a case as well as the trajectory of an 
entire case. Texas’s law, for example, permits (1) dismissal of an entire 
complaint if the Court finds that it has been filed in violation of the anti-
SLAPP law, (2) fee shifting for successful motions to dismiss, (3) a stay 
of all discovery during the pendency of a motion to dismiss or any appeal, 
and (4) interlocutory appeals of denials of motions to dismiss.68 Thus, 
even if only one claim of many is alleged to have violated the anti-SLAPP 
statute, the remedies provided under Texas’s law can affect an entire case. 
In the traditional Erie diversity context, many courts would find that 
Texas’s anti-SLAPP statute is substantive and applicable in federal 
 
 66.  State Anti-SLAPP Laws, PUBLIC PARTICIPATION PROJECT, http://www.anti-
slapp.org/your-states-free-speech-protection (listing state anti-SLAPP laws) [https://perma.cc/2DN5-
DKFK] 
 67.  For a criticism of the reach of current anti-SLAPP laws, see Alexander A. Reinert, SPEAK 
FREE Act Would Silence Civil Rights and Public Interest Litigants (Editorial), THE HILL (July 7, 
2016). 
 68.  Tex. Civ. Prac & Rem § 27.003(c) (providing for stay of discovery on filing of motion to 
dismiss); id. § 27.008 (providing for interlocutory appeal); Id. § 27.009 (providing for award of 
attorneys’ fees). 
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court.69 And some have applied anti-SLAPP laws to state law claims made 
in the context of a federal question lawsuit.70 But courts have been hesitant 
to apply anti-SLAPP laws to federal question claims.71 In one intellectual 
property case, for example, a court explicitly held that anti-SLAPP laws 
applied to the defendant’s state-law counterclaims, but not to the 
plaintiff’s federally-created patent infringement action.72 The defendant 
had argued that the anti-SLAPP law should apply to all claims but the 
court rejected that contention without any analysis.73 
It should be obvious, however, that even if limited to state law claims 
in federal civil rights litigation, anti-SLAPP laws could undermine 
important federal interests. Staying all discovery and permitting 
interlocutory appeals, even if the ultimate remedy of dismissal and fee 
shifting is limited to state law claims, will interfere with the enforcement 
of federal rights in federal courts. It thus may make sense to disaggregate 
elements of an anti-SLAPP law before determining how it should apply 
in the context of a federal civil rights litigation. 
 
 69.  United States v. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co., Inc., 171 F.3d 1208 (9th Cir. 1999) 
(holding statute was applicable to state law counterclaims asserted in a federal diversity action); 
Mitchell v. Hood, 614 F. App’x 137, 140 (5th Cir. 2015) (recognizing disagreement among courts of 
appeals as to whether state anti-SLAPP laws apply in federal court); Henry v. Lake Charles Am. 
Press, L.L.C., 566 F.3d 164, 168-69 (5th Cir. 2009) (“Louisiana law, including the nominally-
procedural Article 971 (Louisiana’s anti-SLAPP provision), governs this diversity case.”); Williams 
v. Cordillera Commc’ns, Inc., 2014 WL 2611746, at *2 (S.D. Tex. June 11, 2014) (explaining that 
state anti-SLAPP statutes “are enforceable in federal courts sitting in diversity jurisdiction” by virtue 
of the Erie doctrine). 
 70.  United States ex rel. Newsham v. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co., Inc., 190 F.3d 963, 970 
(9th Cir.1999), and Dealertrack, Inc. v. Huber, 460 F.Supp.2d 1177, 1181 (C.D. Cal. 2006), held the 
anti-SLAPP statute applicable to state-law counterclaims in federal courts. 
 71.  Best v. Hendrickson Appraisal Co., Inc., No. 06-CV-1358 W (JMA), 2007 WL 1110632, 
at *2–3 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2007) (“Erie applies in federal court, even on some federal claims (contra 
Best), but the court must analyze more than the “twin aims of Erie “ before it chooses to apply state 
law (contra Hendrickson).”); See NCDR LLC v. Mauze & Bagby, PLLC, 2012 WL 12871954, at *2 
(S.D. Tex. October 5, 2012), aff’d on other grounds, 745 F.3d 742 (5th Cir. 2014) (holding that the 
TCPA does not apply to plaintiff’s federal Lanham Act claims because it would create an obstacle to 
the federal rights in violation of the Supremacy Clause); See also Hilton v. Hallmark Cards, 599 F.3d 
894, 901 (9th Cir. 2010) (refusing to apply anti-SLAPP statute to a Section 43(a) Lanham Act claim 
on the ground that “the anti-SLAPP statute does not apply to federal law causes of action”); Tobinick 
v. Novella, 108 F.Supp.3d 1299, 1302 n.1 (S.D. Fla. 2015) (holding state anti-SLAPP statute does not 
apply to Lanham Act claim); Doctor’s Data, Inc. v. Barrett, 2011 WL 5903508, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 
22, 2011) (refusing to apply Illinois anti-SLAPP rules to Lanham Act claim); Misko v. Backes, No. 
3:16-CV-3080-M (BT), 2018 WL 2335466, at *2 (N.D. Tex. May 4, 2018), report and 
recommendation adopted, No. 3:16-CV-3080-M (BT), 2018 WL 2329306 (N.D. Tex. May 23, 2018) 
(refusing to apply anti-SLAPP statute to federal question claim). 
 72.  Globetrotter Software, Inc. v. Elan Comput. Grp., Inc., 63 F.Supp.2d 1127, 1129–30 (N.D. 
Cal. 1999) 
 73.  Id. 
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E. State Immunity Doctrine in Federal Civil Rights Litigation 
Finally, although courts have rarely seen this issue as a choice of law 
problem, the role of state immunity law in federal civil rights litigation 
merits further inquiry. It would appear to be obvious that whether an 
individual is immune from damages liability is substantive in the 
traditional procedural/substantive distinction. And under traditional Erie 
analysis, one would expect state immunity law to apply to state law claims 
raised in diversity cases. 
But how should the matter be analyzed in federal civil rights 
litigation? There are three different contexts in which to consider the 
question. First, although the immunity defense itself may be substantive, 
it might be more difficult to characterize common-law doctrines that 
operate at the margins of immunity doctrine. Take, for example, the issue 
of whether immunity determinations are reviewable interlocutorily. 
Federal law says that they are in certain situations, but state law sometimes 
diverges.74 In Bradley, the Court applied state law regarding interlocutory 
appeals to adjudicate a state law claim that was brought as a supplemental 
claim in a Section 1983 action.75 If state law granted broader rights of 
interlocutory appeal than federal law, however,76 this may be a 
circumstance where application of state law meant to favor state 
institutions would be inappropriate where the jurisdictional grant is based 
on a federal civil rights statute. 
Difficult questions could also arise where the substance of immunity 
law differs at state and federal law. If state law, for example, provides 
broader immunity to state officers than does federal law, it would be 
inconsistent with the principles I have elaborated upon here to apply state 
immunity law to the federal civil rights claim. And even as to which 
immunity law governs the state law claim, difficult questions could 
arise.77 In Kohlrautz, the Court conducted a nuanced Erie analysis, taking 
into account jurisdictional context to determine that state (rather than 
federal) immunity law should apply to state law claims brought via 
supplemental jurisdiction in a federal question case. 
Finally, the framework I have outlined here may also have 
implications for the rare case in which state immunity law exposes state 
officers to greater liability under state law than would federal immunity 
 
 74.  See, e.g., Bradley v. City of Ferndale, 148 F. App’x 499, 511 (6th Cir. 2005). 
 75.  Id. 
 76.  Say, for example, that state law permitted appeal of denials of immunity at summary 
judgment when the issue turned on questions of fact, even though such appeals would not be 
cognizable under federal common law. Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304 , 313-17(1995).   
 77.  Kohlrautz v. Oilmen Participation Corp., 441 F.3d 827, 830–33 (9th Cir. 2006). 
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principles. Courts have not generally seen this as a choice of law problem 
raised by the RDA, but courts should. Maryland, for example, does not 
permit state officials to assert any immunity from liability for violations 
of the state constitution.78 If the defendant is shown to have acted 
intentionally, as opposed to negligently, she also will not be entitled to 
immunity from common law torts.79 In Maryland, therefore, one could 
argue that federal courts should respect these substantive judgments in 
application of the Section 1983 doctrine. It would not interfere with any 
federal interests to do so, and it would advance state substantive 
judgments. Additionally, to the extent that federal courts are available in 
civil rights actions in order to avoid the risk of bias in favor of state 
institutions and state actors, applying state privilege law that is more 
rights-protective than federal law would not trigger any concerns of bias 
in favor of states and the state’s entities or actors. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Erie’s takeaway is that much turns on whether a state law is deemed 
substantive or procedural. But this assessment cannot be undertaken 
without being conscious of the jurisdictional context in which any conflict 
arises. As I have argued elsewhere, diversity cases present a different 
context than federal questions cases. As I argue here, civil rights cases 
present a different context as well. In some circumstances, as in diversity 
cases, it will make sense to apply state law through and through to state 
law claims presented in federal question or federal civil rights cases. In 
other contexts, federal law should govern the entire matter. Finally, there 
may be some contexts in which state law should apply to federal civil 
rights cases because it is more rights-protective than federal judge-made 
common law. 
 
 
 78.  DiPino v. Davis, 729 A.2d 354, 371 (Md. 1999) (“Unlike in a § 1983 action and unlike in 
an action for some common law torts, neither the local government official nor a local governmental 
entity has available any governmental immunity in an action based on rights protected by the State 
Constitution.”). 
 79.  Cox v. Prince George’s County, 460 A.2d 1038 (Md. 1983). 
